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COMPOUNDING CRIMES:
TIME FOR ENFORCEMENT?
Compounding is a largely obscure part of American criminal law,
and compounding statutes have become dusty weapons in the prosecu-
tor's arsenal. An examination of this crime reveals few recently re-
ported cases. Its formative case law evolved primarily during the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries. As a result, one might expect
to find that few states still retain compounding provisions in their stat-
ute books. The truth, however, is quite to the contrary: compounding
laws can be found in forty-five states.1
This note will define the compounding of crimes, offer a brief re-
view of its nature and development to provide perspective, and distin-
guish it from related crimes. It will analyze current American com-
pounding law, explore why enforcement of compounding laws is dis-
favored, and suggest that more vigorous enforcement may be appropri-
ate, especially as a weapon against white collar crime. It will also eval-
uate the Model Penal Code approach towards compounding, and pro-
pose an alternative to it through the increased availability of judicially-
sanctioned compromise of criminal cases.
Definition, Examples, and Problems
Compounding is a distinct offense which depends on the commis-
sion of an antecedent crime. Thereafter, one who accepts something
of value under an unlawful agreement not to report or prosecute the
perpetrator of the antecedent crime, or to handicap the prosecution of
his case, compounds the original crime.2 Typical statutes define com-
pounding in terms of an "agreement . . . to compound or conceal [an]
offense, or not to prosecute . . . or not to give evidence thereof
A straightforward example of compounding would be the follow-
ing: A, an employee, discovers unmistakable evidence that B, another
employee, has embezzled funds from their employer. A confronts B,
1. See note 69 infra.
2. See R. PEamNs, CRimiNAL LAw 518 (2d ed. 1969) Tereinafter cited as
PERINs]. Note that only the one who accepts a consideration commits the offense.
But see text accompanying notes 77-78 infra, concerning the minority view by which
the one who offers a consideration is also guilty.
3. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-303 (1960).
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who confesses. Eager to avoid exposure, B offers A his car, which A
had often admired previously, in return for A's promise not to report
the crime. By accepting the car, A compounds B's offense.
A more difficult case arises when the victim of the antecedent
crime is the one who compounds: C, the employer, discovers the evi-
dence of B's embezzlement. Although his impulse might be to call
the police, assume he decides that his primary concern is to get the
money back. Perhaps the loss is uninsured.4  C also wants to avoid
any unfavorable publicity about the company.5 Accordingly, instead
of reporting the crime C confronts B, who confesses. They bargain
and C agrees not to report or prosecute the crime in return for a prom-
issory note from B for the amount he had taken. Here, by the majority
American rule, C also has compounded B's crime, even though the con-
sideration for the illegal agreement was repayment of his own loss. 6 But
a growing minority view, reflected in the Model Penal Code,7 grants C
an affirmative defense that he accepted no more than what he thought
due him as restitution or indemnification. s It is an open question which
is the better view.9
Compounding involves certain practical as well as theoretical
problems. Perhaps foremost among these is the difficulty in discover-
ing that it has occurred. For instance, in the first example above, the
compounding might come to light if B's embezzlement was discovered
by C or by another employee, and B was arrested. Suspecting that he
had been betrayed, B might reveal his illegal bargain with A, but oth-
erwise it might never be known. Discovery is even less likely in the
second example, for if both parties kept their bargain, how would a
prosecutor ever discover the embezzlement, much less the compound-
ing? What are the signs which should alert a prosecutor to investigate
for possible compounding?' ° Even after discovery, a prosecutor faces
4. See text accompanying notes 134-37 infra.
5. For a list of possible motives for concealing the crime, see text accompany-
ing notes 120-29 infra.
6. This is in accordance with the common law, which made no exception if the
consideration was restoration of the victim's property, or payment of damages. See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.32A, Comment at 203 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
7. See id. § 242.5 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
8. See text accompanying notes 97-101 infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 147-73 infra.
10. If the compounding agreement was not to report the crime, a prosecutor may
never discover either the original offense or the compounding. See text accompanying
notes 153, 166 infra. If the crime already had been reported and an investigation or
prosecution commenced, a lack of enthusiasm in the complaining witness may signal that
a compounding has occurred. If he changes his testimony or refuses to testify alto-
gether, the witness may be liable for obstructing justice or as an accessory after the fact.
See text accompanying notes 26-32 infra.
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difficult problems including deciding whether or not to prosecute,
meeting a difficult burden of proof, and overcoming possible jury bias."
The Nature of Compounding
Compounding is a common law crime.' 2 Known originally as
theft-bote, it occurred, according to Blackstone, "where the party
robbed not only knows the felon, but also takes his goods again, or
other amends, upon agreement not to prosecute."'" Note, however,
that the modem conception of the offense does not restrict potential
compounders only to victims of a crime, but also includes third parties
who knew of it,' 4 as illustrated in the first hypothetical example above.
Under the common law, both felonies and misdemeanors could be
compounded.' 5 This is still the general rule, but some jurisdictions re-
strict compounding only to felonies; hence the offense is sometimes
known as "compounding felony."' 6
The elements of compounding may be described as (1) knowl-
edge of commission of the original crime; (2) an agreement not to re-
port or prosecute that crime; and (3) the receipt of a consideration.'1
11. See text accompanying notes 109-13 infra.
12. People v. O'Rear, 220 Cal. App. 2d 927, 929, 34 Cal. Rptr. 61, 62 (1963);
PERiNs, supra note 2, at 518.
13. 4 W. BLACESTONE, COMMENTARIES *133. It was a serious offense: "This per-
version of justice, in the old Gothic constitutions, was liable to the most severe and in-
famous punishment. And the Salic law 'latroni eum similem habuit, qui furtum celare
vellet, et occulte sine judice compositionem ejus admittere [considers him, who would
conceal a theft, and secretly receive a composition for it without the knowledge of the
judge, in the same light as the thief].' By statute 25 George II, c. 36, even to adver-
tise a reward for the return of things stolen, with no questions asked, or words to the
same purport, subjects the advertiser and the printer to a forfeiture of 501. each." Id.
at *133-34.
14. Some authorities define compounding too narrowly by limiting the offense
only to those "directly injured" by the commission of the original crime. See, e.g., 15
AM. Jun. 2d Compounding Crimes § 1 (1964); 3 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRMINAL
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1287 (1957). Contra, MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.32A, Com-
ment at 20 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959): "Prosecution is almost invariably against persons
who, being merely witnesses of an offense with which they have no private concern as
victim or otherNise, take money for a promise not to report or testify." See also Sanders
v. State, 89 Ind. App. 113, 165 N.E. 784 (1929); State v. Ruthven, 58 Iowa 121, 12
N.W. 235 (1882). Certainly in those states where a victim of crime has the benefit
of an affirmative defense to compounding so that he may freely bargain with the crim-
inal for restitution, the primary thrust of a compounding law would seem to be towards
third party offenders. One directly injured could compound a crime only by seeking
more than his due. See text accompanying notes 97-101, 147-73 infra.
15. See State v. Carver, 69 N.H. 216, 39 A. 973 (1898); W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr,
HANDBOOx ON CR MrNAL LAw 527 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE & Scorr].
16. Only 13 states restrict compounding to felonies. See note 90 infra.
17. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 15, at 526. Professor Perkins, however, questions
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Analyzing these elements, the actual commission of an antecedent
crime is considered essential. As one court stated, "There could be
no compounding of a crime unless there was a crime to compound."'18
Some jurisdictions, however, permit compounding charges to be
brought and prosecuted even though the perpetrator of the antecedent
crime has not yet himself been tried for his offense. 9 The rationale
for this view is that the compounding is complete once the agreement
has been reached, and does not depend on the subsequent apprehen-
sion and conviction of the one whose crime is compounded.2 °
The heart of the offense is the agreement to conceal or abstain
from prosecuting the original crime. 21  Thus, by the traditional view,
a victim of a crime, while not barred from seeking restitution from the
one who has harmed him, must avoid such an agreement:
[I]t is not unlawful for the wrongdoer to make restitution and to
satisfy the civil liability created by the wrong. Neither does the
law prevent one whose property has been stolen or embezzled
through the commission of a crime, to compromise with the wrong-
doer, if it is not agreed, either expressly or impliedly, that the pros-
ecution for the offense shall be suppressed or stayed. 22
A modern view, adopted in the Model Penal Code, grants the victim
much wider latitude in bargaining.2"
Some consideration must accompany the agreement. It can be
anything of value, or the promise thereof. 4 The consideration need
not benefit the compounder directly, but may go to another. 5
whether knowledge of commission of the specific offense is an essential element. See
PERKINS, supra note 2, at 521.
18. Hays v. State, 142 Ga. 592, 593, 83 S.E. 236, 237 (1914); accord, Woodham
v. Allen, 130 Cal. 194, 62 P. 398 (1900). In State v. Ross, 152 Kan. 495, 105 P.2d
879 (1940), the court required the alleged crimes to be detailed with particularity.
"mhe facts of such antecedent crime must be set forth in the information so that the
defendant may know what antecedent crime he is alleged to have compounded and pre-
pare his defense thereto." Id. at 498, 105 P.2d at 881. Contra, Sheppard v. State. 151
Ga. 27, 105 S.E. 601 (1921); State v. Carver, 69 N.H. 216, 39 A. 973 (1898); Fribly
v. State, 42 Ohio St. 205 (1884). It was held in Fribly that requiring a prosecutor to
allege the actual commission of the original crime imposed a "double burden, making
conviction difficult if not impossible .... ." Id. at 206.
19. See text accompanying notes 85-87 infra.
20. See text accompanying note 88 infra. See also State v. Ash, 33 Ore. 86, 54
P. 184 (1898) (breakdown in the agreement, followed by subsequent prosecution of the
original offender, held no defense to compounding); Campbell v. State, 42 Tex. Crim.
27, 57 S.W. 288 (1900).
21. Austin v. Feron, 289 Ill. App. 528, 7 N.E.2d 476 (1937); see Fountain v. Big-
ham, 235 Pa. 35, 84 A. 131 (1912).
22. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Grand Nat'l Bank, 69 F.2d 177, 180 (8th Cir.
1934); accord, Blair Milling Co. v. Fruitiger, 113 Kan. 432, 215 P. 286 (1923).
23. See text accompanying notes 97-101 infra.
24. Commonwealth v. Pease, 16 Mass. 91 (1819).
25. Hays v. State, 15 Ga. App. 386, 83 S.E. 502 (1914); State v. Ruthven, 58 Iowa
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Related Offenses
When compounding occurs, the circumstances involved may closely
overlap other crimes. For example, if the perpetrator of the antece-
dent crime is to be tried, and as the result of a compounding agree-
ment the compounder refuses to testify or changes his testimony, this
may give rise to obstruction of justice charges.2 6 Various reasons may
induce a prosecutor to ignore the compounding and look for other
crimes. 27  The following are some crimes with a particuarly close rela-
tionship to compounding.
Accessory After the Fact
Originally, one who compounded was held to be an accessory to
the antecedent crime.28 Parallels still remain, for in both crimes there
is a requirement that there have been an antecedent crime, and that
the offender have known of it.2 9  The distinction rests on the manner
in which the accessory aids the principal: "Being an accessory implies
some sheltering or concealment, while compounding is an abstaining
from a prosecution."30 Thus being an accessory hinges on an affirma-
tive act, such as harboring an offender; aiding him to escape; conceal-
ing, destroying, or tampering with evidence; inducing a witness to be
absent, give false information, or remain silent; or giving false testi-
mony oneself."' Compounding, on the other hand, depends on an
agreement not to act, as in not reporting, not prosecuting, or not giving
evidence of a crime.3 2
Extortion
A statutory form of extortion, also known as blackmail, includes
threatening to accuse someone of a crime unless a payment of money
121, 12 N.W. 235 (1882). In State v. Ash, 33 Ore. 86, 88, 54 P. 184, 185 (1898),
the court said it was unnecessary for the compounder to retain any of the consideration
for himself, and it was no defense that he was following another's instructions.
26. See 67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice § 7 (1950).
27. See text accompanying notes 105-13 infra, concerning the difficulties a prose-
cutor faces in bringing compounding charges. Wherever possible, prosecutors may
choose conspiracy rather than compounding charges, if the state's definition of conspir-
acy and the specific facts permit. This option recognizes conspiracy's advantages to
a prosecutor vis-h-vis compounding's disadvantages. Telephone interview with Herbert
Edelhertz, Battelle Law & Justice Study Center, July 31, 1974; see LAFAVE & ScoTr,
supra note 15, at 455-57.
28. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTAiES *133.
29. See LAFAvE & ScoTt, supra note 15, at 522.
30. See Note, Compounding Offenses, 55 DICx. L. Rav. 356 (1951).
31. See LAFAvE & Scorr, supra note 15, at 523.
32. Cf. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 95-98 (1961).
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is made. 3 Compounding, however, does not require a threat or coer-
cion as part of the bargaining process; agreement to conceal the crime
might be based on persuasion or even on the good will of the com-
pounder.
The degree of resemblance between extortion and compounding
varies according to the jurisdiction. It may be very close. For exam-
ple, although there is no federal law against compounding labeled as
such, it has been argued that section 873 of Title 18, United States
Code, entitled "blackmail," is in reality a compounding law. It pro-
vides:
Whoever, under a -threat of informing, or as a consideration for not
informing, against any violation of any law of the United States,
demands or receives any money or other valuable thing, shall be
fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than one year,
or both.34
Here the disjunctive phrases emphasized permit the statute to be ap-
plied when there is no threat or demand, so that the offense appears
to be a variety of compounding, one dealing only with the reporting
(but not the prosecuting) of crimes.3 5 Nevertheless, compounding
and federal blackmail are not identical. In particular, one of the ele-
ments of compounding, the requirement that the actor have specific
knowledge of the commission of the antecedent crime, is missing. One
court has even suggested that under the federal blackmail provision not
only is it unnecessary to state which federal law has been violated, it
is also unnecessary to allege and prove that the victim actually violated
33. 86 C.J.S. Threats & Unlawful Communications § 3 (1954). As used here, ex-
tortion does not refer to the common law concept of wrongfully obtaining property under
color of office, but is used in the broader modem day meaning of the term. See W.
CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES 897-98 (7th ed. 1967).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 873 (1970) (emphasis added).
35. According to the drafters of the Model Penal Code, "[t]here is no federal
compounding statute." MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.32A, Comment at 210 (Tent. Draft
No. 9, 1959). But see 1 NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS,
WORKINO PAPERS 577-78 (1970). "[Bloth the language of 18 U.S.C. § 873 (blackmail)
and the fact that it is derived from 18 U.S.C. § 250 (part of the obstruction of justice
chapter, 1940 ed.), support the view that there is a statutory basis for a Federal offense
of compounding." Id. at 578 n.37. In support of the latter view, it can be noted that
this provision formerly was placed immediately before the misprision of felony statute
in the federal criminal law. See Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, §§ 145-46, 35 Stat.
1114. These two crimes have long been closely linked and are combined under the title
"compounding offenses" in West Publishing Company's key number system, which pre-
dates this 1909 juxtaposition of the two federal statutes. See WEST'S LAw FINDER 16
(1967). On the other hand, the blackmail section is not derived from common law
compounding, which applied to all crimes, but from an 1866 enactment by which it ap-
plied only to internal revenue violations. See Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 9, 14
Stat. 146.
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any particular federal law.3 6 Consequently, it would seem that this
blackmail statute resembles but is less rigorous than compounding.3"
Misprision of Felony
Misprision of felony is often closely linked with compounding, s
and thus deserves special attention. The origin of common law mispri-
sion of felony is cloudy. According to one scholar, it was never prop-
erly part of the common law, but was attributed to it through ancient
error.3 9 Nonetheless, it has long been considered a common law
crime. In its modem form it consists of "failing to communicate to the
proper authority one's knowledge of the commission of a felony...40
Compounding can be distinguished from common law misprision
of felony in that agreement is essential to compounding, whereas there
need be no agreement in misprision.4 ' Moreover, misprision can be
36. Roberts v. United States, 248 F. 873, 877 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 247 U.S.
522 (1918); see Jefford v. United States, 31 F.2d 908, 909 (8th Cir. 1929); United
States v. Holmes, 110 F. Supp. 233 (S.D. Tex. 1953). It has been held that the federal
blackmail law is applicable even where no federal crimes have yet been committed, but
are merely intended in the future. Farkas v. United States, 2 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1924).
This interpretation was justified on the basis that "the evil sought to be guarded against
is as serious. . . in the case of a contemplated future as of a completed past violation
of law... ." Id. at 646.
37. An affirmative defense, comparable to the Model Penal Code's defense to
compounding, has been proposed for the equivalent of the present blackmail section in
a new federal criminal code. The proposed section, entitled "Criminal Coercion," pro-
vides that "[a] person is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor if, with intent to compel an-
other to engage in or refrain from conduct, he threatens to . . . accuse anyone of a
crime ....
"It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that the actor be-
lieved, whether or not mistakenly . . . that a purpose of the threat was to cause the
other to... make good a wrong done by him.. . ..." NATIONAL COMm'N ON REnoiu
OF FEDERAL CnnINAL LAws, FINAL REPORT § 1617 (1971).
38. See note 35 supra.
39. Glazebrook, Misprision of Felony-Shadow or Phantom? (Pts. I & 11), 8 AM.
J. LEGAL HisT. 189, 283 (1964). The author argues that the qualities of the statutory
crime of misprision of treason, a separate and distinct offense, were transferred to mis-
prision of felony by an author's or printer's error in 1557, and subsequent commentators
have carried the error forward to the present day. Id. at 287-88, 295, 299. See gen-
erally Note, Misprision of Felony: a Reappraisal, 23 EMORY L.J. 1095 (1974) [herein-
after cited as Misprision of Felony].
40. Howard, Misprisions, Compoundings and Compromises, 1959 CRiM. L. REv.
750 [hereinafter cited as Howard]. Misprision of felony is also described as including
the criminal neglect to prevent a felony. See PERmNs, supra note 2, at 512-14. Its ex-
istence as a common law crime was reasserted in a British case in which the House of
Lords affirmed the defendant's conviction for failing to report the theft of arms and am-
munition from a military installation. Sykes v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1962]
A.C. 528. See also Misprision of Felony, supra note 39, at 1097-1100.
41. Howard, supra note 40, at 755. The author offers this example: "A, a rich
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distinguished with respect to the requirement of a consideration as an
element of compounding: no consideration is needed, since "mispri-
sion is a bare concealment of a crime, while compounding is a conceal-
ment for a reward. 42
But misprision of felony in its common law form is rarely found
in American law.43  A statutory form, however, occurs in the federal
law:
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony
cognizable by a court of the United States, conceals and does not
as soon as possible make known the same to some judge or other
person in civil or military authority under the United States, shall
be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than three
years, or both.4
4
This is not the common law offense which required "every man . . .
make himself an informer as to any . . . felony that he witnessed, or
that came to his knowledge. 45  Under the statute as interpreted, the
mere failure to report a crime is not enough; there must also be an
affirmative act of concealment.46 This requirement of an act of con-
cealment converts the offense into little more than being an accessory
after the fact.47
It has been suggested that the rationale for the distinction between
the common law crime and the federal statute is stated in a well-known
dictum by Chief Justice John Marshall:
bachelor, dies intestate. B, a close friend of his, forges a will by A leaving his estate
to B and C, another close friend whom B has included in the will to increase its appear-
ance of veracity. C knows nothing of the felonious forgery, but after the spurious will
is admitted to probate discovers the true facts by accident. He decides, without consult-
ing B, to keep his knowledge to himself in order to benefit under the 'will.' C has com-
mitted misprision but not compounding." Id.
42. 15A C.J.S. Compounding Offenses § 1 (1967).
43. Cf. Misprision of Felony, supra note 39, at 1108-09.
44. 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1970).
45. Commonwealth v. Lopes, 318 Mass. 453, 456, 61 N.E.2d 849, 850 (1945).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Daddano, 432 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1970); Neal v.
United States, 102 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 679 (1940); Bratton
v. United States, 73 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1934); United States v. Farrar, 38 F.2d 515
(D. Mass. 1930). In Lancey v. United States, 356 F.2d 407 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 922 (1966), it was suggested that merely harboring an offender might consti-
tute concealment under 18 U.S.C. § 4. See 1 NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED-
ERA S CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 530 n.5 (1970); Misprision of Felony, supra
note 39, at 1101-06.
47. See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra. Nonetheless, the federal crime of
accessory after the fact is distinguishable from federal misprision. An accessory "re-
ceives, relieves, comforts, or assists" one who has committed a federal crime. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3 (1970). The act of concealment which the courts have required in misprision, how-
ever, may not necessarily aid a federal offender within the accessory formula. See Mis-
prision of Felony, supra note 39, at 1104-05.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27
It may be the duty of a citizen to accuse every offender, and to
proclaim every offense which comes to his knowledge; but the law
which would punish him in every case for not performing this duty
is too harsh for man.48
Misprision of felony in any form is rare today. Two states, Maine
and New Jersey, have misprision of felony statutes paralleling the fed-
eral law.4 There is some evidence that common law misprision of fel-
ony may still exist in a few states.50 Recent statutes enacted in Wash-
ington and Ohio, however, may signal new vitality for misprision, and
a return to its common law concept. Washington limits the offense to
withholding knowledge of felonies involving violence.51 Ohio ap-
proaches common law misprision even more closely, requiring that "No
person, knowing that a felony has been or is being committed, shall
knowingly fail to report such information to law enforcement authori-
ties." 52  Ohio does, however, include many qualifications and excep-
48. Marbury v. Brooks, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 556, 575-76 (1822); see LAFAvE &
ScorT, supra note 15, at 526; PERKiNs, supra note 2, at 515; Misprision of Felony, supra
note 39, at 1109: "The principle set forth in this statement has been the guiding force
in the treatment of misprision by the courts." In People v. Lefkovitz, 294 Mich. 263,
293 N.W. 642 (1940), the court rejected common law misprision of felony as unsuited
to American criminal law. Cf. Note, 54 HAnv. L. Rav. 506 (1941); Note, 32 VA. L.
REV. 170, 172 (1945).
49. See ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 902 (Supp. 1974); NJ. REV. STAT. §
2A:97-Z (1969). New Jersey restricts concealment only to "arson, manslaughter,
murder, or. . . any high misdemeanor." Id. Maine, however, closely parallels the fed-
eral law, although its statute is disjunctive in a key phrase where the federal law is con-
junctive, punishing one who "conceals or does not as soon as possible disclose" a crime.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 902 (Supp. 1974) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the
statute has been interpreted to be conjunctive in effect, so that both concealment and
failure to disclose a crime are necessary just as in the federal law. See State v. Michaud,
150 Me. 479, 114 A.2d 352 (1955). The Maine statute also exempts persons treating
drug abusers from disclosing their knowledge of possession or use of drugs. ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 902 (Supp. 1974). See generally Misprision of Felony, supra note
39, at 1106-08.
50. The existence of common law misprision of felony was upheld in a Rhode
Island case testing the sufficiency of an indictment. See State v. Flynn, 100 R.I. 520,
217 A.2d 432 (1966). In Delaware, it has been held that a statute providing generally
that common law offenses not otherwise specified in Delaware law were misdemeanors
included misprision of felony. See State v. Biddle, 32 Del. 401, 124 A. 804 (Del. Ct.
Gen. Sess. New Castle Co. 1923). A Vermont court, although reversing a conviction
for an insufficient indictment, suggested that common law misprision of felony was part
of the law of that state. See State v. Wilson, 80 Vt. 249, 67 A. 533 (1907).
51. "Whoever, having witnessed the actual commission of a felony involving vio-
lence or threat of violence or having witnessed preparations for the commission of a
felony involving violence. . . does not as soon as reasonably possible make known his
knowledge of such to the prosecuting attorney, police, or other public officials of the
state... shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor: Provided, That nothing in this act
shall be so construed to affect existing privileged relationships as provided by law."
WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.69.100 (Supp. 1973).
52. OnHo REv. ComE § 2921.22 (Spec. Supp. 1973) (effective Jan. 1, 1974).
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tions. Medical personnel are specifically required to report any
wounds treated which apparently were caused by violence. The stat-
ute exempts disclosure if there is a recognized privilege, such as at-
torney-client, doctor-patient, priest-penitent, or husband-wife; if dis-
closure would tend to incriminate a member of the actor's immediate
family; if disclosure would reveal a news source; and if disclosure would
reveal information about a participant in a registered drug treatment
program.5" At the same time, it shields those who may wish to dis-
regard these privileges: "No disclosure of information .. . shall give
rise to any liability or recrimination for a breach of privilege or confi-
dence."54
Misprision of felony has been criticized as vague and having an
absurdly broad scope. 5 It has also been called obsolete. 6 In addition
to the Ohio and Washington statutes discussed above, however, it should
be noted that limited applications of the principle which underlies mis-
prision are frequently encountered. 7 For example, hospital or phar-
macy personnel may be required under the threat of a criminal sanc-
tion to report injuries inflicted by deadly weapons.58 Perhaps the most
prevalent example of a limited kind of misprision, although not la-
belled as such, occurs in child abuse reporting laws.5 They are found
in forty-nine states.6° Originally aimed only at physicians and impos-
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Howard, supra note 40, at 754. See also Misprision of Felony, supra note
39, at 1110-11.
56. See Note, 54 HDv. L. REv. 506 (1941); Note, 32 VA. L. RV. 170, 171-72
(1945). Contra, Goldberg, Misprision of Felony: An Old Concept in a New Context,
52 A.B.A.J. 148, 149-50 (1966). The author called for a reimposition of full-strength
common law misprision of felony to counteract the lack of citizen involvement which
has contributed to the current crime explosion, speculating that it would have "a very
salutary influence in our distressed society." Id. The interpretation of the federal mis-
prision statute requiring a positive act of concealment was lamented as "emasculating"
it. id. at 149.
57. It has recently been suggested that misprision of felony should be preserved
only if it is limited to certain categories of crime or is restricted to certain classes of
persons. Misprision of Felony, supra note 39, at 1112-18.
58. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 11160 (West Supp. 1975). The scope of injury
reporting laws may be broader, extending beyond those employed in health services. In
New Hampshire, for example, any person who has "knowingly treated or assisted an-
other for a gunshot wound or for any other injury he believes to have been caused by
a criminal act" is guilty of a misdemeanor if he fails to notify law enforcement author-
ities immediately "of all the information he possesses concerning the injury." N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 631:6 (Supp. 1973).
59. See generally Fraser, A Pragmatic Alternative to Current Legislative Ap-
proaches to Child Abuse, 12 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 103 (1974); Paulsen, Child Abuse Re-
porting Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1967); Note, The
Legal Response to Child Abuse, 11 WM. & MARY L. REv. 960 (1970).
60. ALA. CODE tit. 27, §§ 21-25 (Supp. 1973); ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.17.010-.070
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ing on them a duty to report suspected cases of child abuse, many of
these statutes have been broadened to include nurses (35 states),"'
(1971); Auz. REV. STAT. ANN. H9 13-842.01(A)-(E) (Supp. 1973); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 42-801 to -806 (Supp. 1973); CAL. PEN. CODE § 11161.5, 11162 (West Supp. 1975);
COLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. H3 22-10-1 to -7 (Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
38a (Supp. 1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, H3 1001-08 (Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 828.041 (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111 (Supp. 1974); HAw. REV. STAT. H§
350-1 to -5 (Supp. 1974); IDAHo CODE §§ 9-203, 16-1624, -1625, -1628, -1641, -1642
(Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2042-47 (Supp. 1974); IND. CODE § 12-3-
4.1-1 to -6 (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. H§ 235A.1-.8 (1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. H9 38-
716 to -721 (Supp. 1972); Ky. REv. STAT. § 199.335 (1972); LA. REv. STrAT. § 14:403
(1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, H3 3851-55 (Supp. 1974); MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 35A (Supp. 1974); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, H3 51A-F (Supp. 1974);
Mici. CoMP. LAws ANN. H3 722.571-.574 (Supp. 1974); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554
(Supp. 1974); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-11 (Supp. 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105
(Supp. 1975); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 10-1303 to -1305 (Supp. 1974); NEB. RPv.
STAT. H3 28-481 to -484 (Supp. 1972); NEV. REv. STAT. H3 200.501-.509 (1973); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.1 to -8.15 (Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-14.1 (Supp.
1973); N.Y. Soc. SEnv. LAW H§ 411-20 (McKinney Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. H3
110-115 to -122 (Supp. 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE H3 50-25-01 to -05 (1974); Omo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Supp. 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, H3 845-48 (Supp. 1974);
ORE. REv. STAT. § 418.740-.775 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, H3 2101-09 (Supp.
1974); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. H3 40-11-1 to -10 (Supp. 1973); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-
310.1 to -310.6 (Supp. 1973); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. H§ 26-10-10 to -15 (Supp. 1974);
TENN. CODE ANN. H3 37-1202 to -1209 (Supp. 1974); TEx. FAM. CODE H3 34.01-.06
(1975); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 55-16-1 to -6 (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, H§
1351-55 (1974); VA. CODE ANN. H§ 16.1-217.1 to -217.4 (Supp. 1974); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. H§ 26.44.030-.080 (Supp. 1973); W. VA. CODE ANN. H3 49-6A-1 to -4 (Supp.
1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (Supp. 1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN. H§ 14.28.7 to -28.13
(Supp. 1973).
61. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Supp. 1973); ALASKA SrAT. § 47.17.020 (1971); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 42-802 (Supp. 1973); CAL. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West Supp. 1975);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-10-2 (Supp. 1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(b)
(Supp. 1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1002 (Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. § 828.041(4)
(Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111(a) (Supp. 1974); HAW. REv. STAT. § 350-1
(Supp. 1974); IDAHo CODE § 16-1641 (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2042
(Supp. 1974); KAN. S-AT. ANN. § 38-716 (Supp. 1972); IA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403
(c)(1) (1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(c) (Supp. 1974); MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (Supp. 1974); MiCH. COMP. Lws ANN. § 722.571(1) (Supp.
1974); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554(2) (Supp. 1974); MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-11
(Supp. 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105 (Supp. 1975); MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 10-
1304 (Supp. 1974); NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.502(2)(c) (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-
14-14.1(A) (Supp. 1973); N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 413 (McKinney Supp. 1974); N.C.
GEN. STAT. H§ 110-117 to -118 (Supp. 1974); N.D. CENT. CODE § 50-25-01 (1974);
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Supp. 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (Supp.
1974); ORE. REv. STAT. H3 418.740, .750 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2103 (Supp.
1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-217.1 (Supp. 1974); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030
(Supp. 1973); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6A-2 (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.981
(Supp. 1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-28.8 (Supp. 1973). The figures given in the text
for the number of states requiring nurses, social workers, teachers, and law enforcement
officials to report child abuse update those found in Fraser, A Pragmatic Alternative
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social workers (30 states), 2 teachers (28 states), 63 and law enforce-
ment officers (13 states). 64  Six states have adopted an approach
closely resembling common law misprision in that they require any per-
son with reason to believe a case of child abuse has occurred to report
it,65 and twelve others, after specifying one or more of the various
to Current Legislative Approaches to Child Abuse, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 103, 109-10
(1974).
62. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Supp. 1973); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (1971); CAL.
PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West Supp. 1975); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-10-2 (Supp.
1969); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(b) (Supp. 1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 1002 (Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. § 828.041(4) (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-
111(a) (Supp. 1974); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1 (Supp. 1974); IDAHO CODE § 16-1641
(Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2042 (Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-
716 (Supp. 1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.403(c)(1) (1974); MD. ANN. CODE art.
27, § 35A(c) (Supp. 1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (Supp. 1974);
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 722.571(1) (Supp. 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105 (Supp.
1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-1304 (Supp. 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502
(2)(d) (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-14.1 (A) (Supp. 1973); N.Y. Soc. SuRv. LAw
§ 413 (McKinney Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. §5 110-117 to -118 (Supp. 1974); OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Supp. 1973); ORE. REV. STAT. 55 418.740, .750 (1974);
S.D. CoMP. LAws § 26-10-10 (Supp. 1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-217.1 (Supp. 1974);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (Supp. 1973); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6A-2 (Supp.
1974); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 48.981 (Supp. 1974); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-28.8 (Supp.
1973).
63. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Supp. 1973); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (1971); CAL.
PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West Supp. 1975); CONN. GEN. SrAT. ANN. § 17-38a(b) (Supp.
1974); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1002 (Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. § 828.041(4) (Supp.
1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111(a) (Supp. 1974); HAW. REV. STAT. § 350-1 (Supp.
1974); IDAHO CODE § 16-1641 (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2042 (Supp.
1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-716 (Supp. 1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(c)(1)
(1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(c) (Supp. 1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
119, § 51A (Supp. 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105 (Supp. 1975); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 10-1304 (Supp. 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.502(2)(d) (1973); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 13-14-14.1(A) (Supp. 1973); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 413 (McKinney Supp.
1974); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 110-117 to -118 (Supp. 1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2151.421 (Supp. 1973); ORE. REV. SrAT. §§ 418.740, .750 (1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
11, § 2103 (Supp. 1973); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-217.1 (Supp. 1974); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.44.030 (Supp. 1973); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6A-2 (Supp. 1974); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 48.981 (Supp. 1973); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-28.8 (Supp. 1973).
64. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(b)
(Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-111(a) (Supp. 1974); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §
2042 (Supp. 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-716 (Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 35A(c) (Supp. 1974); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (Supp. 1974); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.571(1) (Supp. 1974); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 10-1304
(Supp. 1974); N.Y. Soc. SEav. LAW § 413 (McKinney Supp. 1974); N.C. GEN. STAT.
55 110-117 to -118 (Supp. 1974); ORE. REV. STAT. H5 418.740, .750 (1974); S.D. COMp.
LAWS ANN. § 26-10-10 (Supp. 1974).
65. IND. CODE § 12-3-4.1-2 (1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-481 (Supp. 1972); NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (Supp. 1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1203 (Supp. 1974); TEx.
FAM. CODE § 34.01 (1975); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-16-1 (Supp. 1973). Among these
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classes of persons required to report, add that any other person who
has reasonable cause to suspect child abuse must also make a report.66
It must be noted, however, that while these child abuse reporting
laws employ the principle of misprision of felony, they are readily dis-
tinguishable from it in that they are restricted to a certain type of of-
fense which may or may not be a felony; and most apply only to a small
segment of society, not society at large. Moreover, only thirty states
impose penal sanctions for failure to comply.67
Wherever misprision of felony laws apply, it is evident that one
who compounds a crime will be twice liable: once for concealing the
crime, and once again for concealing it by an illegal agreement for a
consideration.6 8
Current American Compounding Law
Criminal liability for compounding is pervasive in American law,
at least in theory. In forty-five states, the compounding of a crime may
states, Texas alone does not impose a criminal penalty for failure to report. See text
accompanying note 67 infra.
66. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 21 (Supp. 1973); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-10-2
(Supp. 1969); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 16, § 1002 (Supp. 1972); IDAHO CODE § 16-1641
(Supp. 1974); Ky. REV. STAT. § 199.335(2) (1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(e)
(1971); MoNrT. REv. CODES ANN. § 10-1304 (Supp. -1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-
14.1(A) (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-118(a) (Supp. 1974); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 846, (Supp. 1974); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10.1(a) (Supp. 1973); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 14-28.8 (Supp. 1973).
67. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 25 (Supp. 1973); Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-842.01 (D)
(Supp. 1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-806 (Supp. 1973); CAL. PEN. CODE § 11162 (West
1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 17-38a(b) (Supp. 1974); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 16, §
1008 (Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.041(11) (Supp. 1974); IND. CoDE § 12-3-
4.1-2 (1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-720 (Supp. 1972); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.990
(7) (1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403(I) (1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 3855 (Supp. 1974); MIcH. COM. LAws ANN. § 722.575 (1974); MrNN. STAT. ANN.
§ 626.554(7) (Supp. 1974); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.108 (Supp. 1975); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 28-484 (Supp. 1972); NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.507 (1973); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.14
(Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-14.1(c) (Supp. 1973); N.Y. Soc. SEnv. LAw
§ 420 (McKinney Supp. 1974); Omo REX'. CODE ANN. § 2151.99(C) (Supp. 1973);
OKrA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (Supp. 1974); PA. SAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2109 (Supp.
1974); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-310.5 (Supp. 1973); S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 26-10-13
(1974); TENN. CDE ANN. § 37-1211 (Supp. 1974); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 55-16-6 (Supp.
1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1355 (1974); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.080
(Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.9&1(3) (Supp. 1974).
68. This would be true at present in Washington, which includes concealing a
crime within its definition of compounding. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.69.090 (1961).
But it would not be true in Ohio, where compounding applies only to the abandonment
of a pending criminal prosecution. Omo REv. CoDE § 2921.21 (Supp. 1973). It is
noteworthy that proposals to reform the federal criminal law would eliminate section
4 of title 1-8, the existing misprision of felony section, and substitute instead a "hinder-
ing law enforcement" section which absorbs the concealment aspect of misprision but
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be prosecuted as a statutory offense;69 in two others it apparently may
be prosecuted as a common law offense.70
Wording of compounding statutes varies considerably. Twenty-
seven states have adopted a similar approach, 71 of which the following
example from California is typical:
eliminates the failure to report requirement. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws, FINAL REPORT § 1303 (1971); S. 1, § 2-6B3, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973); S. 1400, § 1311, 93d Cong., lst Sess. (1973).
69. See ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 98 (1959); ALASKA STAT. § 11.30.190 (1970); ARIz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-321 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2813 (1964); CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 153 (West 1970); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-8-108 (1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 1246 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 843.14 (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2504
(1972); No. 9, § 1013, [1972] Haw. Acts 112-13; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1601 (1972);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 32-1 (Supp. 1974); IND. CODE §§ 35-1-91-1 to -3 (1968);
IOWA CODE ANN. 99 722.1-.2 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3807 (Supp. 1973); ch.
406, § 165, [1974] Ky. Acts 858; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:131 (1974); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 901 (1965); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 36 (1970); MICH.
COMp. LAws § 750.149 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.42(1)(6) (1964); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 97-9-7 to -9 (1972); Mo. ANN. STrAT. §§ 557.170-.180 (1953); MONT. REv.
CODES ANN. § 94-7-305 (Supp. 1973); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-709 (1964); NEV. REv.
STAT. § 199.290 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 642:5 (Supp. 1973); NJ. REV. STAT.
§ 2A:97-1 (1969); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-22-6 (1972); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.45
(McKinney 1967); OHIO REv. CODE § 2921.21 (Supp. 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§9 543-44 (1958); ORE. REV. STAT. § 162.335 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5108
(1973); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-1-5 (1970); S.D. COMp. LAWS §§ 22-3-6 to -7
(1969); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-3101 to -3103 (1955); TEX. PEN. CODE tit. 8, § 38.06
(1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-308 (Supp. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 8 (1974);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-303 (1960); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.69.090 (1961); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 61-5-19 (1966); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 946.67 (1958); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§
6-158 to -160 (1959). See also CANAL ZONE CODE tit. 6, § 601 (1963); GUAM PENAL
CODE § 153 (1970); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 33, § 498 (1969); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14,
§ 521 (1964). North Dakota's compounding laws were repealed June 30, 1975. Ch.
116, § 41, [19731 N.D. Laws 300. Their repeal apparently results from a restructuring
of the North Dakota criminal law along the lines of the federal criminal code proposed
by the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws. See Nodland, How
to Identify Criminals and Other Citizens of North Dakota after July 1, 1975, 50 N.D.L.
REv. 617 (1974).
70. See MD. CONST., Decl. Rights, art. 5 (1972) (common law applicable); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1969) (common law in force). The same may be true in the Dis-
trict of Columbia. See D.C. CODE ENCYL. ANN. § 22-107 (1967) (common law crimes
punishable).
71. Twenty-two states utilize almost identical language. See ALASKA STAT. §
11.30.190 (1970); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-321 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
41-2813 (1964); CAL. PEN. CODE § 153 (West 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 843.14 (Supp.
1974); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1601 (1972); IND. CODE §§ 35-1-91-1 to -2 (1968); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 722.1 (1950); ME. REv. &rAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 901 (1965); MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 268, § 36 (1970); MIcH. COMp. LAws § 750.149 (1968); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 97-9-7 to -9 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 557.170-.180 (1953); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40A-22-6 (1972); OKLA. STA. ANN. tit. 21, § 543 (1958); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 11-1-5 (1969); S.D. COMp. LAws § 22-3-6 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3101
(1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 8 (1974); VA. CoDE ANN. § 18.1-303 (1960); W.
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Every person who, having knowledge of the actual commission
of a crime, takes money or property of another, or any gratuity
or reward, or any engagement, or promise thereof, upon any
agreement or understanding to compound or conceal such crime,
or to abstain from any prosecution thereof, or to withhold any evi-
dence thereof, except in the cases provided for by law, in which
crimes may be compromised by leave of Court, is punishable
72
Compounding statutes, however, are by no means uniform. The
offense may be known as something other than "compounding.173  It
may be defined only in terms of an agreement not to report the com-
mission of a crime,74 or it may be limited only to an agreement to aban-
don a pending prosecution.7 5  To "compound" a crime may be a statu-
tory offense without any further definition of what the offense entails. 76
In the common law, and according to most statutes, the offense
of compounding can only be committed by one who receives a consid-
eration, not by one who offers it. This feature of the orime was criti-
cized in the commentary to the Model Penal Code:
A curious aspect of the law of compounding, which raises
some doubt as to its purpose, is the rule that the person who pays
the consideration for the promise not to prosecute does not commit
the offense . . . . The most outright attempt by a murderer or
his relatives to buy off the widow would not make them guilty of
compounding, although it might run afoul of laws defining obstruc-
tion of justice, subornation of perjury, or accessory after the fact.
This result [is] inconsistent with the notion that this law is to pre-
vent obstruction of justice. .... 77
Six states-Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, New Hampshire, New York,
and Utah-have adopted this point of view, and 'their compounding
VA. CoDE ANN. § 61-5-19 (1966); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-158 to -159 (1959). See also
CANAL ZONE CODE tit. 6, § 601 (1963); P.R. L.Aws ANN. tit. 33, § 498 (1969); V.L
CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 521 (1964). Five states vary the pattern slightly. See ALA. CoDE
tit. 14, § 98 (1959); ILA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:131 (1974); MINN. SrAT. ANN. § 609.42
(1)(6) (1964); NEv. REv. STAT. § 199.290 (1973); WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.69.090
(1961).
72. CAL. PEN. CODE § 153 (West 1970).
73. In Minnesota and Mississippi it is included under "bribery." MiNN. STAT.
ANN. § 609.42 (1964); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-9-7 to -9 (1972). In Utah it is called
"acceptance of bribe or bribery to prevent criminal prosecution." UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-8-308 (Supp. 1973). In Puerto Rico it is labelled an "agreement to conceal commis-
sion of crime." P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 33, § 498 (1969).
74. See, e.g., ORE. Rnv. STAT. § 162.335 (1973).
75. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2504 (1972).
76. See NEa. REv. STAT. § 28-709 (1964); NJ. REv. STAT. § 2A:97-1 (1969).
77. MoDEL PENAL CODE § 208.32A, Comment at 206-07 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959) (citation omitted). In neither this draft nor the final version, however, was it
proposed that both offering and receiving a consideration be included as part of the
wording of the compounding section. See id. § 242.5 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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statutes punish both.7"
Another variation in compounding laws followed by several states
is to make institution of criminal proceedings against the perpetrator
of the antecedent crime a condition precedent to compounding.79  In
Georgia, for intance,
A person is guilty of compounding a crime when, after institution
of criminal proceedings and without leave of the court. . . he ac-
cepts or agrees to accept any benefit in consideration of a promise,
express or implied, not -to prosecute or aid in the prosecution of
a criminal offense.80
There appears to be little justification for this condition. Theoretically,
if the object of compounding laws is to avoid "perverting public justice
. . .by making a bargain to allow the criminal to escape conviction,"8 "
there is no basis for distinguishing between a bargain consummated be-
fore or after criminal proceedings begin. The harm is not less in the
former case," and it would seem more consistent with the object of
compounding laws to punish the earlier bargain as compounding, rather
than omit it or try to fit the activity into another category of crime.
Indeed, the omission might prompt such bargains, as long as they could
be completed before criminal proceedings commenced. From a prac-
tical standpoint, this approach also requires a precise definition of when
criminal proceedings began.
Four states have created an additional crime called "compounding
prosecution,"8 3 although each has a compounding statute of the usual
pattern. This extra crime specifically prohibits an agreement for con-
sideration "to compound, discontinue or delay any prosecution then
78. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1246 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 32-1
(Supp. 1974); ch. 406, § 165, [1974] Ky. Acts 858; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 642:5
(Supp. 1973); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 215.45 (McKinney 1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
8-308 (Supp. 1973). According to the Illinois statute, a person "compounds a crime
when he receives or offers to another any consideration for a promise not to prosecute
or aid in the prosecution of an offender." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 32-1 (Supp. 1974)
(emphasis added). The other five states all use wording such as that in the New York
compounding statute, whereby one compounds a crime when "(a) He solicits, accepts
or agrees to accept any benefit upon an agreement or understanding that he will refrain
from initiating a prosecution for a crime; or (b) He confers, or offers or agrees to con-
fer, any benefit upon another person upon an agreement or understanding that such
other person will refrain from initiating a prosecution for a crime." N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 215.45 (McKinney 1967) (emphasis added).
79. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2921.21 (Supp. 1973); TEx. PEN. CODE tit. 8 §
38.06 (1974).
80. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2504 (1972) (emphasis added).
81. Rieman v. Morrison, 264 Ill. 279, 284, 106 N.E. 215, 217 (1914).
82. For an analysis of the harm inherent in compounding, see text accompanying
notes 147-173 infra.
83. See IND. CODE § 35-1-91-3 (1968); OKILA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 544 (1958);
S.D. CoMP. LAWS § 22-3-7 (1969); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-160 (1959).
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pending .... "84 But these "compounding prosecution" statutes ap-
pear to be redundant, since -the basic compounding law in each state
includes agreements to "compound," to abstain from prosecution, or to
withhold evidence. The basic statutes might not necessarily cover an
agreement to delay a prosecution, however, so that a "compounding
prosecution" provision may have at least that one separate function.
Eight states expressly permit a defendant to be tried for com-
pounding notwithstanding the fact that the perpetrator of the antece-
dent crime has not been brought to justice,85 und the same result can
be inferred in several other states.86  In Oregon, for example, "It is
no defense to a prosecution for . . .compounding that the principal
offender is not apprehended, prosecuted, convicted or punished."87
Nonetheless, without clear evidence of the commission of the antece-
dent crime, especially through the conviction of the original offender,
the task of convicting a compounder becomes even more challenging.88
In a large majority of states, any crime can be compounded,
whether felony or misdemeanor. Some states have created separate but
parallel compounding laws, one for felonies and one for misdemean-
ors;s but only thirteen limit compounding exclusively to feloniesY0
Although misdemeanors may be subject to compounding in the
majority of jurisdictions, in many states they receive special treatment.
Judicially-sanctioned compromise is permitted for certain restricted cat-
egories of misdemeanors where otherwise there might be a compound-
ing violation.9 1 Where the practice is authorized, the privilege to com-
84. IND. CODE § 35-1-91-3 (1968).
85. See ALA. CODE fit. 14, § 98 (1959); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2814 (1964); IowA
CODE ANN. § 773.49 (1950); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 557.190 (1953); NEv. REV. STAT. §
199.290(2) (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-22-6 (1972); S.D. COMP. LAws § 23-10-
6 (1969); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.69.090 (1961). See also V.L CODE ANN. fit.
14, § 521(b) (1964).
86. See MlNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.42(1) (6) (1964) ("purported crime" sufficient);
ORE. REv. STAT. § 162.335 (1973) ("suspected commission" of a felony sufficient).
87. ORE. REv. STAT. § 162.345 (1973).
88. See text accompanying notes 107-13 infra.
89. See IND. CODE §§ 35-1-91-1, -2 (1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 557.170, .180
(1953); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-158, -159 (1959).
90. See ALA. CODE fit. 14, § 98 (1959); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2813 (1964); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 843.14 (Supp. 1974); IowA. CODE ANN. § 722.1-2 (1950); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 14:131 (1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 901 (1965); MASS. GN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 268, § 36 (1970); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.149 (1968); MIss. CODE ANN.
H8 97-9-7 to -9 (1972); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-7-305 (Supp. 1973); ORE. REv.
SrAT. § 162.335 (1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-1-5 (1969); VT. STAT. ANN. fit.
13, § 8 (1974).
91. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.120 (1972); AiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1591
(Supp. 1973); CAL. PEN. CODE H§ 1377-79 (West 1970); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3401
to -3404 (1948); NEv. REv. STAT. § 178.564-.568 (1973); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. H§
663-66 (McKinney 1958); OKLA. STAT. ANN. fit. 22, § 1291-94 (1958); PA. R. CiM.
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promise a misdemeanor is quite limited. Generally the victim must
have a civil action against the perpetrator of the original crime, and
three classes of misdemeanors are exempted, as in this example from
California:
When the person injured by an act constituting a misdemeanor has
a remedy by a civil action, -the offense may be compromised . . .
except when it is committed:
1. By or upon an officer of justice, while in the execution
of the duties of his office;
2. Riotously;
3. With an intent to commit a felony.9 2
The compromise procedure calls for the injured party to appear
before the trial of the offender in the court where the latter is to be
tried. If the injured party then acknowledges satisfaction for his injury,
according to most statutes the court has discretion to dismiss the case. 3
If the court exercises this discretion, the disposition of the case is to
be entered in the record, -and the dismissal will be a bar to any future
prosecution for the same offense. 94  The courts, however, have con-
strued these statutes quite strictly, so that such compromises may not
in fact be readily available.95 Thus the scope of existing compromise
P. 145, 315; S.D. COmp. LAws §§ 23-33-1 to -4 (1969); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-50-1
to -3 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-18 (1960). See also CANAL ZONE CODE tit. 6 §§
4821-24 (1963); GUAM PENAL CODE §§ 1377-79 (1970); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, §§
4051-52 (1967). Curiously, a few states which restrict compounding only to felonies
nonetheless have enacted statutes permitting compromise of misdemeanors. See, e.g.
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 794.1-.4 (1950); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, §§ 55-56 (1972);
ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 135.703 to .709 (1973). See generally Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 315
(1972).
92. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1377 (West 1970). Alaska adds to the list of exceptions
all crimes committed larcenously. ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.120 (1972). Arizona adds ve-
hicular manslaughter. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1591 (1973). Pennsylvania restricts
compromise to misdemeanors "not alleged to have been committed by force or threat
thereof." PA. R. CGlM. P. 145(c) (1974).
93. See, e.g., N.Y. CODE CUM. PROC. § 644 (McKinney 1958).
94. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1292-3 (1958). In Massachusetts, an
approved compromise is a bar to subsequent civil action. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
276, § 56 (1972). Approval of the prosecutor as well as the court may be required.
See Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-51 (1973); PA. R. CIUM. P. 145 (1974).
95. Concerning approved compromises, one court has recently said: "[T]he prin-
ciple is applicable only in that class of cases where the offense involves no crime against
society or good morals, but relates solely to the redressing of private-property wrongs.
' In one class of cases, the public wrong is merged in that of the individual, and
compensation to him, is accepted as the adequate measure of redress. In the other, the
individual grievance is swallowed up in the greater wrong done to society; and nothing
but public punishment will suffice, to vindicate the violated law." Childs v. State, 118
Ga. App. 706, 708, 709, 165 S.E.2d 577, 579, 580 (1968). Examples of this strict inter-
pretation of compromise statutes are found in People v. O'Rear, 220 Cal. App. 2d 927,
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statutes is limited. They do not apply to any felonies, and exclude
many misdemeanors. Furthermore, almost all states having compro-
mise statutes expressly prohibit -any nonstatutory compromise.e 6
An alternative to the narrow compromise statutes may be available
in some cases, however. Ten states permit a victim of a crime to
compound it, provided he is not greedy and accepts no more than
What he lost as a consideration for his bargain."7 The Model Penal
Code xecommended this approach in terms of an affirmative defense:
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution [for compounding] that
the pecuniary benefit did not exceed an amount which the actor
believed to be due as restitution or indemnification for harm caused
by the offense.98
Nine states have adopted this defense,99 and one other, Wisconsin, has
a statute which predates the Model Penal Code but achieves the same
effect.100  The net effect of the defense is that a victim of crime is
granted a free hand to bargain with the criminal for recovery of his
loss without culpability for compounding. Its scope is broader 'than the
34 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1963) (compromise applicable only to crimes where a civil remedy
was created), and People v. Trapp, 46 Misc. 2d 642, 260 N.Y.S.2d 305 (Nassau County
Dist. Ct. 1965) (injured party required to actually appear to acknowledge satisfaction).
In a recent Oregon case, an approved compromise and dismissal of criminal charges was
reversed because there had not been proper acknowledgement of satisfaction, and be-
cause the compromise statute had been misapplied. On the latter point, the defendant
had been charged with a felony. While the lower court judge had the power, under Ore-
gon law, to enter judgment for a misdemeanor upon conviction if he considered a felony
sentence too harsh, it was held that he could not apply that power retroactively to permit
compromise before conviction, since the compromise statute applied only to misde-
meanors. State v. Dumond, 526 P.2d 459 (Ore. App. 1974).
96. See, e.g., Amuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1591(C) (Supp. 1973): "No public of-
fense shall be compromised or the prosecution or punishment upon a compromise dis-
missed or stayed except as provided by law."
97. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-8-108(2) (1972); DEL. CRIM. CODE § 1247
(1973); No. 9, § 1013(2), [1972] Haw. Acts 112-13; Ky. REv. STAT. § 519.030(2)
(1975); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 642:5 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 215.45(2)
(McKinney 1967); OMo REv. CODE § 2921.21(B) (Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 5108(b) (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-308(2) (Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 946.67(2) (1958).
98. MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.5 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
99. See states (excluding Wisconsin) cited in note 97 supra. Ohio permits the
affirmative defense to be raised only if the crime compounded was theft, passing bad
checks, or misuse of credit cards. Omo R.v. CODE § 2921.21 (Supp. 1974). New York
and Ohio qualified the Model Penal Code approach by requiring that the amount re-
ceived be what the defendant reasonably believed due him. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 215.45
(2) (McKinney 1967); Omo REv. CODE § 2921.21(B) (Supp. 1974).
100. Wisconsin excuses a victim of crime "if the act upon which the actual or sup-
posed crime is based has caused a loss for which a civil action will lie and the person
who has sustained such loss reasonably believes that he is legally entitled to the property
received." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.67(2) (1958).
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compromise of misdemeanor statutes, since it applies to all crimes and
does not require judicial approval.''
If this or other defenses fail, a compounder may face punishment
which can vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, making gen-
eralization difficult. A few states merely impose a fine;102 others re-
quire imprisonment.'013 But in the great majority of states, punishment
will lie somewhere between these extremes, and often the severity of
the punishment varies with the gravity of the crime compounded.'0 4
Nonenforcement of Compounding
Compounding is only rarely prosecuted. One indication of this
is the astonishingly small number of reported appellate cases. An ex-
amination of the digests of cases in the American Digest system cover-
ing the years 1658 to 1975 reveals only forty-five cases involving com-
pounding. 105 In the absence of a comprehensive survey of prosecutors,
no precise figure for the number of compounding cases tried in lower
courts is available, but it seems quite safe to say that compounding is
a disfavored offense in the eyes of prosecutors. 06
101. For a discussion of some of the problems implicit in this defense, see text ac-
companying notes 147-73 infra.
102. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 32-1, 1005-1-17 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-709 (1964).
103. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2813 (1964); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 97-9-7 to
-9 (1972); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-303 (1960).
104. In California, for example, compounding is punishable "[bly imprisonment in
the State Prison not exceeding five years, or in a County Jail not exceeding one year,
where the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in the State Prison for life;
. . .[b]y imprisonment in the State Prison not exceeding three years, or in the County
Jail not exceeding six months, where the crime was punishable by imprisonment in the
State Prison for any other term than for life; [or] [bly imprisonment in the County
Jail not exceeding six months, or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, where the
crime was a misdemeanor." CAL. PEN. CODE § 153 (West 1970). Maine has perhaps
the most curious measure of punishment for compounding. If the offense compounded
is punishable by imprisonment for life or for an unlimited term, the compounder may
be fined not more than $500 or be imprisoned for not more than five years. But if
a lesser crime was compounded, punishable by confinement in a state prison for a lim-
ited term, the compounder is to receive both a fine of not more than $500 and imprison-
ment (but for less than one year). See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 901 (Supp.
1973).
105. The total excludes cases cited under the heading "Compounding Offenses"
which involve misprision of felony rather than compounding. See 19 WESr's GENERAL
DIGEST 284 (1971) (only volume of GENERAL DIGEST citing a compounding case); 6
SEVENTH DECENNIAL DIGEST 16 (1967); 5 SixTH DECENNIAL DIGEST 1601 (1957); 8
FIrH DECENNIAL DIGEST 1484-85 (1948); 6 FouRTH DECENNIAL DIGEST 760 (1937);
6 THIRD DECENNIAL DIGEST 242-43 (1928); 5 SECOND DECENNIAL DIGEST 476-77
(1919); 4 DECENNIAL ED., AMERICAN DIGEST 1444 (1908); 10 CENTURY ED., AMERICAN
DIGEST 934-35 (1899).
106. "With the possibility of a loss higher than average, the prosecutor who must
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There are valid reasons for compounding's unpopularity. One of
the most significant is the difficulty of obtaining a conviction. A pros-
ecutor has noted that when compounding charges are brought, the pros-
ecutor's star witness is usually a criminal-the perpetrator of the origi-
nal offense against the compounder.10 7  From a jury's perspective, the
witness's conduct may be viewed as far more reprehensible than the
compounder's, and thus the credibility of the witness may be difficult
to establish. The burden could be even greater in those states where
one who offers as well as one who receives -a consideration may com-
pound 'a crime,' 08 since there the prosecutor would face dual com-
pounding trials, presenting each defendant in turn as the key witness
against the other.
There are additional considerations in a compounding prosecu-
tion. If a white collar crime is involved, it is probable that the com-
pounder will be well represented 'by counsel, with the concomitant pos-
sibility of a 'longer and more challenging trial.'0 9  Conviction may be
unobtainable if the jury sympathizes with the compounder as a victim
of crime himself." 0  If circumstances permit, the prosecutor may
charge crimes other than compounding because they carry more severe
punishment."' When restitution has been made, the prosecutor may
be tempted to drop the entire matter, excusing both the original of-
fender and the compounder. Restitution could increase the difficulty
of convicting the original offender due to jury sympathy or lack of en-
thusiasm and cooperation from the victim-compounder. This in turn
could complicate the prosecutor's task in any compounding trial, since
it would be more difficult to establish the commission of the antece-
exercise his discretion would have to think twice about bringing such a case." Letter
from Herbert Edelhertz to author, Aug. 8, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Edelhertz Letter].
For example, no compounding cases have been recently prosecuted in the cities of San
Francisco or Honolulu. Interview with Julian D. Rhine, Assistant San Francisco Dis-
trict Attorney, in San Francisco, Sept. 12, 1974 [hereinafter cited as Rhine Interview];
telephone interview with Barry Chung, Honolulu Prosecuting Attorney, Aug. 12, 1974;
cf. Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 S. CAL. L. RaV. 1, 2 (1927).
107. Rhine Interview, supra note 106.
108. See text accompanying notes 77-78 supra.
109. See H. EDELHERTZ, THE NATURE, IMPACT AND PROSECUTION OF WHrrE-COL-
LAR CluME 42 (1970) [hereinafter cited as EDELHERTZ]. The author discusses the pres-
sures prosecutors may face generally in evaluating whether or not to prosecute white col-
lar crimes. Id. at 42-44.
110. "Compounding charges will ordinarily have to be brought against a subject
who has not, himself, committed what a jury would consider to be a crime, and may
be in a sympathetic position, just trying to make himself whole. Unless there are special
circumstances, a defendant charged with compounding will have a clean record, lots of
character witnesses, and be rather well defended." Edelhertz Letter, supra note 106.
111. For example, compounding may be punishable only by the imposition of a
fine. See text accompanying notes 102-04 supra.
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dent crime."' Thus, rather than face not one but two potentially chal-
lenging trials, a busy prosecutor may be content to forego any prosecu-
tion. 113
It may then be asked whether compounding is obsolete and should
be removed from the books. In view of at least occasional enforce-
ment of compounding, however, as well as its inclusion in the Model
Penal Code and its frequent reconsideration in state legislatures (which
have chosen to retain it within state criminal codes),' it seems to
have enough vitality to warrant retention." 5
Compounding and White Collar Crime
Does compounding occur frequently in connection with white col-
lar crime? If it does, could condonation of such compounding aggra-
vate the white collar crime problem? There are no simple answers,
since it is impossible to determine precisely how much compounding
there is. Those who compound can hardly be expected to come for-
ward and acknowledge their acts. It is possible, however, to note as-
pects of the white collar crime problem which suggest that compound-
ing is a common transaction, and to draw inferences from that conclu-
sion.
The term "white collar crime" is of recent origin. Edwin Suther-
land originally defined it as violations of law by persons in the "upper
socio-economic class.""' 6 But a more useful and less restrictive con-
cept is to consider it
an illegal act or series of illegal acts committed by nonphysical
means and by concealment or guile, to obtain money or property,
to avoid the payment or loss of money or property, or to obtain
business or personal advantage." 7
The extent of white collar crime is enormous. It has been esti-
112. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
113. See generally LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in The United States, 18
AM. J. COMp. L. 532 (1970).
114. See, e.g., ch. 406, § 165, [1974] Ky. Acts 858.
115. "I would, however, wish to leave compounding . . . statutes on the books.
Like a surgeon, a prosecutor may from time to time need a very special instrument to
accomplish his legitimate objectives." Edelhertz letter, supra note 106. But cf. Bon-
field, The Abrogation of Penal Statutes By Nonenforcement, 49 IowA L. REv. 389, 391
(1964) (prolonged nonenforcement of a penal statute is tantamount to nullification);
Note, The Challenge of Obsolete Penal Statutes, 65 J. CrIM. L. 315 (1974).
116. E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 9 (1949).
117. EDELHERTZ, supra note 109, at 3. This definition was adopted by the United
States Chamber of Commerce in its analysis of white collar crimes. See CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, A HANDBOOK ON WHITE COLLAR CRIME 3 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as WHITE COLLAR CRIME].
[Vol. 27
COMPOUNDING CRIMES
mated, using the second definition above, that the total dollar loss to
American business is not less than $40 billion annually. 118 Part of the
difficulty in arriving at a precise figure is the general failure to report
crime. This trend applies to all crimes, not just white collar ones. Pre-
liminary results from a survey by the Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
ministration indicate that in thirteen cities, including the five largest,
fewer than half of all crimes are reported to police. 119 Even without
pinpointing the exact percentage of unreported crime, nonreporting ap-
pears epidemic.
In the white collar crime area, many reasons have been suggested
for the commonplace failure to report crimes. These include: fear of
making management look -bad to stockholders; 20 fear that prosecution
will expose a weakness in the business structure which may educate
potential criminals how to commit like acts; 12 general fear of bad pub-
licity and damage to the company image; 22 fear that disclosure of the
crime will imply negligence in failing to detect it sooner, 23 fear of
countersuits for libel, malicious prosecution, or false arrest;124 disen-
chantment with the trouble, delay, and inconvenience of prosecution;
2 5
disenchantment with light sentences for criminals as the end result of
adjudication; 2 6 fear of revealing illegal practices of the company; 27
sympathy for the offender; 28 and apathy after receiving restitution
from the offender.' 29  This list is hardly exhaustive.
Where a crime is not reported, the circumstances are ripe for com-
118. WHrrE COLLAR CRIME, supra note 117, at 3.
119. What It Takes to Stop Rampant Crime, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, June
10, 1974, at 39. According to Donald E. Santarelli, former head of the Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration, it is attributable to people believing that "reporting
crime, testifying about crime, doing something about crime is not worth their while or
is too costly to them in terms of what's likely to result-and they're probably right."
Id.
120. EDELHERT_, supra note 109, at 31.
121. Id.
122. Id.; Wrrn COLLAR CRIME, supra note 117, at 63; J. HALL, THEFr, LAW AND
SocrEry 309 (2d ed. 1952) (with respect to embezzlement) [hereinafter cited as HALL].
123. WHrrn COLLAR CRnIE, supra note 117, at 63.
124. Id. Such fears may be unfounded. See Hall, supra note 122, at 308.
125. WHrrE COLLAR CRIME, supra note 117, at 63; CoMmrrrEn FOR ECONOMIC DE-
VELOPMENT, REDucING CRIME AND AssURING JusTIcE 62 (1972); EDELHERZ, supra note
109, at 31; HALL, supra note 122, at 308; Rhine Interview, supra note 106.
126. W=rT COLLAR CrUMB, supwi note 117, at 63. "Until courts take a more se-
rious attitude towards white collar crime, citizens will not be seriously motivated to in-
volve themselves in the prosecution of the perpetrator." Rhine Interview, supra note
106.
127. HALL, supra note 122, at 310 (with respect to embezzlement).
128. WHrE COLLAR CIUME, supra note 117, at 63.
129. Id.; HALL, supra note 122, at 311-12 (with respect to embezzlement).
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pounding. The drive for restitution may lead to the neglect of proce-
dural safeguards. 13 0  For example, a 1951 survey of surety companies
by Professor Jerome Hall revealed that actual prosecution of embez-
zlers was rare. 131 Although the surety companies usually favored prose-
cution as a matter of policy, they were by no means unanimous in that
position.' 32  The implication is inescapable that at least some surety
companies tacitly ignored compounding of embezzlements by their in-
sured, or even actively participated in such compounding. 133
Surety companies are regulated by the states, and routinely deal
with white collar crime. Their policies towards reporting and prosecut-
ing crimes should thus be subject to close scrutiny. It is more disturb-
ing to consider the probable behavior of uninsured businessmen when
they become victims of crime. Since they have a far greater stake in
their own private recovery of crime losses, they may be less concerned
with public justice. Thus it can be argued that the unavailability of
crime insurance increases the likelihood of compounding. If so, the
present crime insurance situation is not encouraging. When Hall anal-
yzed embezzlements in 1951, he noted that only a small fraction of the
potential market was covered by insurance.' 34 The situation has not
improved. A 1969 congressional study revealed a "critical shortage"
of crime insurance throughout America's cities: "While the incidence
of crime in the Nation has increased, the relative amount of crime in-
surance available to the small businessman has declined.' 35  Large
corporations generally carry blanket bonds, insuring against any dis-
honesty by any employee.' 36 But countless medium and small enter-
prises have only partial coverage, which may not include white collar
crimes, or have no insurance at all. The new Federal Crime Insurance
Program was designed to help alleviate this situation, but it is currently
available in only fourteen states. Where available, it does not cover
key white collar crimes such as embezzlement. 137  It seems likely,
therefore, that uninsured or under-insured businessmen will continue
130. Cf. EDELHERTZ, supra note 109, at 30.
131. HALL, supra note 122, at 305-06.
132. Id. at 313.
133. See id. at 316. According to Edelhertz, bonding companies and private firms
may still frequently violate compounding laws in their dealings with white collar of-
fenses, but he emphasizes the lack of data on which to substantiate this suspicion. Edel-
hertz Letter, supra note 106; letter from Herbert Edelhertz to author, Oct. 6, 1974.
134. HALL, supra note 122, at 312.
135. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, CRIME AGAINST SMALL BusrNEss,
S. Doe. No. 91-14, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 257 (1969).
136. See O'Connor, More Corporate Pieces in the Security Puzzle, SECURrIy
WORLD, Jan. 1973, at 50.
137. The Federal Crime Insurance Program, HUD Press Release No. 74-63 (Mar.
1, 1974).
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to have strong economic motives for compounding crimes perpetrated
against them.
As a result, it appears that there is a reasonable basis to suspect
white collar crimes are frequently subject to compounding. It remains
to be asked whether nonenforcement of compounding laws may in turn
be contributing to the dimension of the white collar crime problem. To
answer this, the consequences of white collar crime should first be con-
sidered. Such consequences are not measured in dollars alone, although
the estimated loss is staggering by itself. Uncontrolled white collar
crime creates other significant problems, such as loss of public confi-
dence in business, debasement of competition, and retarded economic
growth.138
Compounding enters the picture by permitting a known offender
to escape justice. It seems unfair to apply a different standard to a
criminal who can bargain with his victim after being discovered. For
instance, it is unfair that a tfhief or embezzler who has hoarded his
goods should be able to "buy" his way out of prosecution, while one
who has disposed of them cannot. The social implications of maintain-
ing different standards cannot be ignored. As former United States
Attorney Robert Morgenthau has said,
If the indigent who is brought into [the] precinct stationhouse
rightly believes that the affluent are going unpunished for -their
crimes, then we have not only failed to achieve our goal of equal
justice, but we have also created the condtions that will breed fur-
ther disrespect for the law.139
Attorney General Levi, among others, has criticized our na-
tional tolerence of lawlessness. 4 ° If compounding is condoned, it
should be realized that certain criminals will continue to receive prefer-
138. See WHITE COLLAR CRIME, supra note 117, at 7-8. "Large-scale criminal ac-
tivity, whether organized or spontaneous, undermines an economy based on opportunity
and enterprise, while it fosters a sense of injustice among the poor and the minorities.
No citizen can justify indifference, least of all members of the business community with
their special concern for public safety. Complacency will prove suicidal." COMMITrEE
FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, REDUCING CRIME AND AssURING JUSTICE 9 (1972).
139. Robert Morgenthau, quoted in M. MINTZ & J. COHEN, AMERICA, INC. 273
(1971); see Ogren, The Ineffectiveness of the Criminal Sanction in Fraud and Corrup-
tion Cases: Losing the Battle Against White-Collar Crime, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 959,
960 (1973). White collar criminals receive favored treatment even if they do enter the
criminal justice system and are convicted and sentenced. See Seymour, Social and Ethi-
cal Considerations in Assessing White-Collar Crime, 11 Am. CruM. L. REv. 821, 822
(1973).
140. The Attorney General Speaks Out, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, June 30,
1975, at 32. The Attorney General was quoted as saying: "It's shocking. We have
a country which is very tolerant and has been willing to take a degree of lawlessness
which is rather surprising. I suppose what one has to say is that the main problem
is the willingness of the country to accept . . . [the rising] crime rate, because if we
were not willing to accept it, enforcement against crime would be much better." Id.
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ential treatment. They will be permitted to escape the criminal justice
system through an unsupervised exercise of private prosecutorial dis-
cretion. 4'
Countering the white collar crime problem requires the coopera-
tion of businessmen. Many tools can be used to achieve this coopera-
tion. For example, an appeal may be based on civic duty.'42  It can
be pointed out that reporting a crime and aiding an official investiga-
tion may reveal other previously concealed crimes, while failing to re-
port a crime or compounding it in effect protects them from dis-
covery.'43 Another approach is to convince business leaders that com-
pounding is bad business. A businessman's desire to recover an ill-
afforded loss or to prevent dissipation of stockholder's confidence in
management could be defeated by a bad bargain in a compounding
agreement. Specifically, if a contract or note is accepted pursuant to a
compounding agreement, it may prove entirely worthless, since the
courts have consistently held such consideration to be utterly void as
against public policy.' 44  Thus, compounding would hardly seem to be
a sound business practice, or a policy likely to inspire the approbation
141. See text accompanying notes 147-73 infra.
142. "[Ain overt, well-publicized drive by business to weed out and pursue prose-
cution of white-collar criminals would probably be regarded as a breath of fresh air by
a public long since fed up with policies that cushion the consequences of breaches of
integrity." WHITE COLLAR CRIME, supra note 117, at 64. The U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce does not urge that all offenses be reported, however, arguing that the intent of
the offender and the dollar amount involved in the loss should be considered. Citing
the overburdened criminal justice system, it specifically suggests exempting petty of-
fenses. Id. at 64-65; see Seymour, Social and Ethical Conwiderations in Assessing
White-Collar Crime, 11 AM. CaIM. L. Rav. 821, 825 (1973) (businessmen turning their
backs on crime invites repeated crime). "Every businessman should take an active role
in improving the administration of criminal justice. A prompt and complete report of
every known criminal offense should be made whether committed by employees, com-
pany officers, customers, or elements of organized crime. Aid should be given in prose-
cution of offenders." COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, REDUCING CRIME AND
AssURING JusTIcE 63 (1972).
143. "An investigation of a credit card fraud, for example, could lead to the arrest
of not only the immediate possessor of the card but also a pickpocket, burglar, cargo
thief, or fence. Arrests in connection with an advance fee swindle (fees are paid for
loans that do not materialize) may lead to the discovery that the assets of the "lending
company" are really stolen, counterfeit, or bogus securities, which might be traced back
to a fence, a dishonest broker's employee, or a number of other criminals or illegal oper-
ations." WHrTE COLLAR CRIME, supra note 117, at 11.
144. See, e.g., 17 AM. JuR. 2d Contracts § 202 (1964); Annot., 32 A.L.R. 422
(1924) (regarding embezzlement); Annot., 17 A.L.R. 325 (1922). The validity of a
contract or note for restitution depends on the lack of a compounding agreement: "So
long as there is not included as part of the consideration any agreement, express or im-
plied, that a criminal prosecution shall be suppressed, stifled, or stayed the contract
should be sustained." Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Grand Nat'l Bank, 69 F.2d 177, 180
(8th Cir. 1934).
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of stockholders. Businessmen should be helped to understand that re-
porting and prosecuting the crime is a sounder course, for the criminal
may voluntarily offer restitution to obtain mitigation of -his sentence,
or the court may impose restitution as a term of that sentence, upon
conviction. 145 Moreover, it must be emphasized that by compounding
a crime, the offender is left free -to continue his criminal ways against
others, or even against the compounder himself.
It is one thing to call for cooperation, and quite another to receive
it. Although more like the whip than the carrot, more vigorous en-
forcement of existing compounding laws, with attendant publicity, is
another means of stimulating cooperation with law enforcement author-
ities by highlighting the disadvantages of administering private justice.
Faced with a glaring example of compounding, therefore, a prosecutor
may want to consider dusting off this old weapon and testing its po-
tency.14 6
The Model Penal Code Approach and
the Question of Harm
The essential purpose of compounding laws is to prevent the per-
version of justice. When a crime is committed, the harm extends be-
yond the individual victim. According to Blackstone, crimes "strike at
the very being of society, which cannot possibly subsist where actions
of this sort are suffered to escape with impunity."' 47  Thus it is said
that "the principal injury, in the contemplation of the law, is that which
has been suffered by the public."' 48
145. See Schafer, Compensation of Victims of Criminal Offenses, 10 CRIM. L.
Buu_. 605 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Schafer]. The author favors the imposition of
restitution as part of any criminal sentence. Id. at 636. In appropriate circumstances,
he would impose "correctional restitution" in lieu of other, more retributive forms of
punishment. Id. at 617-19, 630.
146. The Watergate scandal poses an example. Publicly disclosed facts suggest
misprisions of felony may have been committed. See Eldredge, Nixon Should Be Prose-
cuted; Judicial Process Is at Stake, The Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, Aug. 16, 1974,
§ A, at 39. Yet no Watergate defendants have been charged with this offense. See Wol-
per, The Watergate Fallout, Juus DocTOR, Sept. 1974, at 38-39. The federal blackmail
law (18 U.S.C. § 873 (1970)) may also have been violated. See text accompanying
notes 34-37 supra. It is also possible that compoundings may have occurred under state
law in California or Florida. According to the California Attorney General, investiga-
tions of possible state offenses related to Watergate have been conducted, and notwith-
standing the pardon of the former President, he would still be criminally liable for any
state crimes he committed. San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 24, 1974, at 9, col. 6. It
is noteworthy that under California law, acceptance of any gratuity or reward, not just
money or property, can be consideration for a compounding agreement. CAL. PEN.
CODa § 153 (West 1970).
147. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5. See generally J. HALL, GENERAL
PRrNCrPLES OF CRimiNAL LAW ch. VII (2d ed. 1960).
148. LAFAVE & Sco'r, supra note 15, at 411. For a discussion of ancient legal phi-
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Compounding laws are one way in which society recognizes that
it is undesirable to allow private redress of crimes while the larger so-
cietal interest is left unresolved. As one court stated,
It is an elemental principle that a crime, being an offense against
the Commonwealth, may not be condoned or excused by an indi-
vidual so as to cut off the right of the State to prosecute .... 149
This principle was restated in a recent New Jersey case involving
attorneys who permitted their client to pay money in order that criminal
charges against him be dropped. Although the particular facts did not
constitute compounding under New Jersey law, the court nonetheless
suspended the attorneys for unethically thwarting the criminal process.
It said:
A person wronged by the criminal act of another may accept resti-
tution for the civil wrong done to him, but he cannot lawfully agree
not to prosecute the crime. The reason is that private vindication
of the injury done to the victim does not vindicate the public inter-
est in securing justice. Procuring compensation for the victim of
a crime is subordinate to the State's interest in causing crimes to
be punished. 150
Following this line of reasoning, the public interest in securing justice
arises with every crime, and is not extinguished by a criminal's agree-
ment to offer restitution to the victim.
But adoption of the Model Penal Code's affirmative defense to
compounding materially alters this structure upon which the law of
compounding is based. Under it, one accused of compounding has an
affirmative defense "that the pecuniary benefit did not exceed an
amount which the actor believed to be due as restitution or indemni-
fication for harm caused by the offense."''
This defense does not come into play if a third party has com-
mitted the compounding,' 52 and it is clearly inapplicable if a victim of
crime demands more than what he lost for his silence. In the simple
case where a victim of a crime bargains for what he lost and no more,
however, the defense represents a break with the theoretical founda-
tion of compounding and raises troublesome questions. Certainly it is
a reasonable and worthy goal for the victim to be made whole, but
under the Model Penal Code approach, the victim may confront a sus-
pected thief and freely bargain with him. In return for the victim's
silence, the suspected criminal may repay all or part of the value of
losophies in which compensation to the victim of a crime was paramount, see Schafer,
supra note 145, at 605-09.
149. Cook v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 251, 260, 16 S.E.2d 635, 638 (1941).
150. In re Friedland, 59 N.J. 209, 218, 280 A.2d 183, 188 (1971).
151. MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.5 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) (emphasis
added).
152. See note 14 supra.
[Vol. 27
the goods taken. Although the state's right to proceed against the thief
may be undisturbed by the bargain between criminal and victim, if the
parties keep their bargain the crime will probably remain entirely con-
cealed from the state, so that any real opportunity for the state to
exercise its right is lost. In sum, the affirmative defense is a fiat for
a private individual to deprive the criminal justice system of its oppor-
tunity to deal with the suspected criminal; it cannot reasonably expect
to judge him, protect him from abuse, punish, or rehabilitate him. Of-
ficial discretion is nonexistent. 153
The drafters of the Model Penal Code offered the following ra-
tionale for the affirmative defense:
Our society does not, in general, impose penal sanctions to compel
persons to inform authorities of crime. A person who refrains from
reporting a crime of which he was the victim, because his loss has
been made good, is no more derelict in his social duty than one
who, out of indifference or friendship to .the offender, fails to re-
port a known offense. The threat of prosecution for compounding
is, in any event, ineffective to promote reporting of offenses by vic-
tims who are willing to "settle" with the offender, since compound-
ing laws can easily be evaded by accepting restitution or indemnifi-
cation without explicit "agreement" to drop prosecution. Finally,
compounding laws impugn the widespread practice of prosecutors,
who are frequently content to drop prosecution when restitution has
been made ....
[This] [s]ection ...does not require judicial approval as a
condition of exemption from the prohibition of compounding, be-
cause experience has shown that such procedures are rarely in-
voked.15 4
This reasoning is open to serious question. First, it is true in al-
most all jurisdictions that a victim of crime is under no compulsion to
report that crime. It does not follow, however, that one who fails to
report a crime because of his bargain with the criminal for restitiution
"is no more derelict in his social duty than one who, out of indifference
or friendship"' 55 fails to report it. A vital distinction can be made. One
may choose not to report a crime for any reason or no reason (assuming
that common law misprision of felony or its statutory equivalent is not
153. Contrast this with the role of official discretion in judicially-supervised com-
promises. See text accompanying notes 91-96 supra.
154. MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.32A, Comment at 203-04 (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959). The defense has been supported by some authorities. "li]t certainly makes
sense to exclude from the crime of compounding the receipt of a benefit which the vic-
tim of the crime 'believes to be due as restitution or indemnification for harm caused
by the offense."' L.AFAvE & Scorr, supra note 15, at 527. Professor Perkins suggests
the result of this defense "would be to make a fair compromise lawful and to encourage
the reduction of the trial load with dispositions of this nature." PERMNs, supra note
2, at 522.
155. MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.32A, Comment at 203 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
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in force). But what is condemned in compounding is the agreement
not to report or prosecute. Thus the comparison is not apt, for if only
friendship or indifference motivated the failure to report, there would
be no collusive effort to defeat the ends of criminal justice. In that
case, any moral dereliction stems from an act of omission, simply not
reporting the crime. If there is an agreement for a consideration, on
the other hand, the agreement is a clear, identifiable act committed in
dereliction of a social duty. An analogy would be to the basic com-
mon law rule that there is no liability for failure to rescue another, but
there is liability for overtly harming him if a rescue is attempted. 156
In this case, society is harmed by the overt act of agreeing not to report
a crime, and hence liability should attach for the act.
The other reasons offered in support of this affirmative defense
to compounding seem to be based on various assumptions: that the
law can easily be evaded by avoiding any explicit agreement during ne-
gotiations between victim and criminal; that prosecutors will probably
drop the case if restitution is made; and that judicially approved settle-
ments are so rare that they can be omitted entirely.
These assumptions are likewise subject to challenge and offer lit-
tle upon which to justify the affirmative defense. To begin with, com-
pounding does not necessarily require an explicit agreement between
the criminal and the compounder. To the contrary, twenty-four states
provide that an implicit agreement is all that is necessary.' 5 7  Indeed,
it seems reasonable to look to the fact, not the form, of the agreement
to determine culpability.
Similarly, it is not clear that prosecutors inevitably follow a pattern
of dropping prosecutions when restitution has been made. 5 8 But even
156. Cf. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 277 (4th ed. 1971).
157. For example, in Massachusetts the crime is committed "upon an agreement or
understanding, express or implied, to compound or conceal such felony .... ." MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268, § 36 (1970) (emphasis added); see ALASKA STAT. § 11.30.190
(1970); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2813 (1964); DEL. CRIM. CODE § 1246 (1973); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 843.14 (Supp. 1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2504 (1972); IND. CODE §
35-1-91-1 (1971); IowA CODE ANN. § 722.1 (1950); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:131
(1974); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 901 (1965); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 750.149
(1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.42(1)(6) (1964); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-9-7 (1973);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 557.170 (1953); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-22-6 (1972); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 543 (1958); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-1-5 (1970); S.D. COMP. LAWS
§ 22-3-6 (1969); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-3101 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 8
(1974); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-303 (1960); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-5-19 (1966); WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 946.67 (1958); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-158 (1959).
158. Nonetheless, the importance of restitution cannot be denied: "Zeal for prose-
cution seems to flag with the promise of restitution, even on the part of many prose-
cutors. [One] should not overlook the fact that a case may become genuinely less prose-
cutable where there is a victim witness reluctant to help with the prosecution, and that
defense counsel with imagination and skill can use restitution to cast doubts on the crim-
inal intent of his client." Edelhertz Letter, supra note 106.
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assuming that it frequently occurred, how would this justify transferring
the power of decision to the victim? After all, the prosecutor is a pub-
lic officer charged with responsibility to protect the public.1 9 Ac-
cordingly, the standards of the American Bar Association Committee
on the Prosecution and Defense Functions require that prosecutive au-
thority be vested in a public official who is a lawyer subject to standards
of professional conduct and discipline.6 0 Although the lack of ade-
quate checks on the discretionary power of prosecutors has been sug-
gested,161 that is not at issue here. Notwithstanding the possible abuse
of power by some individual prosecutors, it seems far sounder to entrust
such powers to them rather than to untrained private individuals acting
out of strong, if understandable, self-interest. Prosecutors can be
aided in their judgment by their legal education, legal experience, and
legal staffs. Furthermore, guidelines are available to assist them. 162
A victim of crime who exercises prosecutorial discretion under the
Model Penal Code defense can hardly be expected to enjoy the same
resources.
The drafters of the Code argue that judicial approval of settle-
ments is not required "because experience has shown that such proce-
dures are rarely invoked."':6  No authority or statistical basis for this
generalization is offered. Assuming that it is true that judicially-
sanctioned compromise is rarely invoked, however, this would not
necessarily justify its abandonment. Recall that such compromises are
available only by statute; that where available they apply only to some
misdemeanors; and that in addition to their narrow scope they are nar-
rowly construed by the courts.6 4  Hence the real reason judicially ap-
proved compromise may be so rare is simply that it is so rarely avail-
able. Before the principle of judicial overview and approval of com-
promises is abandoned because its procedures are little used, at least
159. "The idea that the criminal law, unlike other branches of the law such as con-
tract and property, is designed to vindicate public rather than private interests is now
firmly established. The participation of a responsible public officer in the decision to
prosecute .. . gives greater assurance that the rights of the accused will be respected
than is the case when the victim controls the process . . . . The absence of a trained
prosecution official risks abuse or casual and unauthorized administrative practices and
dispositions which are not consonant with our traditions of justice." ADVISORY COMM.
ON THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FuNCTIoNS, AMERICAN BAR ASSoCIATION, STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 49 (1970).
160. Id.
161. See LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J.
CoM. L. 532 (1970).
162. See, e.g., NATIONAL DiSTnICr ATroRNEYs ASS'N, T1 PROSECUTOR'S SCREENiNG
FUNTION (1973).
163. MODEL PENAL CODE § 208.32A, Comment at 204 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
But see Note, Restitution and the Criminal Law, 39 COLUm. L. REv. 1185, 1195 (1939).
164. See text accompanying notes 91-96 supra.
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some consideration should be given to ways of improving those proce-
dures. One possible method is discussed below.1 5
Another argument in support of the affirmative defense is the im-
plication that its use does not deprive the state of power to prosecute
the original offender. The commentary supporting adoption of the af-
firmative defense in the Delaware Criminal Code lists this as its pri-
mary justification:
[T]his section would permit an employer, from whom funds had
been stolen, to agree not to inform the police of the crime in re-
turn for his employee's agreement to make full restitution. This
may at first blush appear wrong, but upon careful consideration,
the following arguments may be made in favor:
(1) The section does not say that the employee, for exam-
ple, has committed no crime. He may still be punished, despite
the making of restitution.
On the other side, it may be argued that the crime is com-
mitted against society and that the offender who is not to be pros-
ecuted is potentially dangerous. These arguments are unpersua-
sive when point (1) above is carefully considered, since this section
does not purport -to relieve the underlying offense of any criminal
punishment.166
This rationale, however, ignores a crucial point. At issue is not
whether the original offender is relieved of criminal responsibility in
law, but whether he is relieved in fact. Preserving the state's crim-
inal action against the offender is useless unless the state has a reason-
able opportunity to discover the crime and then decide whether or not
to pursue that action. If the victim is permitted to conceal the crime,
the likelihood of its independent discovery by the state seems remote.
The drafters of the Delaware Criminal Code also argue that "It
is wrong to impose an impossible burden on someone who resorts to
a reasonable means to secure restitution or indemnification for harm
done to him."'16 7 Promising not to report a crime might appear to a
victim of crime to be a reasonable means of recovering his loss, but
it is surely not the only means. Depriving the victim of that one bar-
gaining tool, the promise not to report the offense, does not impose
an "impossible burden" on him. He may still point out to the criminal
the prospective advantages restitution may hold for him: that the pros-
ecutor may decide to drop the case or the judge may be lenient in sen-
tencing. Moreover, the victim retains his civil action for the wrong
done to him. If the criminal can afford to make restitution under the
affirmative defense, he would hardly appear to be judgment-proof.
165. See text accompanying notes 174-82 infra.
166. DEL. CRIM. CODE § 1247, Commentary at 366-67 (1973).
167. Id. at 367.
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The foregoing is not to suggest that restitution is an unimportant
factor in determining the just disposition of a criminal offender, or that
making restitution should not be encouraged. It may be a statutory
cause for mitigation of punishment, 68 or may be considered at other
points in the judicial process," 9 such as in granting probation. But it
is not a defense to crime,17 0 and should not be permitted de facto to
become a means of escaping criminal liability. Restitution should only
influence the criminal process under some official control. If instead
it is available to private individuals upon demand
it entails a kind of blackmail; it means that the threat of the crimi-
nal sanction is employed by those who are not only unschooled in
its proper application, but who are actually impervious to the work-
ings of the criminal code once their immediate, commercial end is
achieved.1 71
A strong argument can be made for the increased use of manda-
tory restitution within the criminal process. 72 Nonetheless, restitution
should not be substituted for criminal sanctions at the whim of an un-
trained private individual. 73 Its employment requires official super-
vision.
An Alternative to the Model Penal Code Approach
Although the Model Penal Code's affirmative defense to com-
168. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 513 (West 1970) (concerning embezzlement):
"Whenever, prior to an information. . . or an indictment. .. charging the commission
of embezzlement, the person accused voluntarily and actually restores . . . the property
alleged to have been embezzled, or any part thereof, such fact is not a ground of defense,
but it authorizes the court to mitigate punishment, in its discretion." But cf. F. BAILEY
& H. RoTmmLATr, DEFENDING BusiNESs AND WmrrE COLLAR CRIMES FEDAL AND STATE
472 (1969), which proposes that defense counsel argue to the jury that restitution, al-
though not a defense, should play an important role in their deliberation of the issue
of fraudulent intent.
169. See, e.g., Laster, Criminal Restitution: A Survey of Its Past History and an
Analysis of Its Present Usefulness, 5 U. RICH. L. Ruv. 71 (1970); Schafer, supra note
145.
170. See, e.g., Chick v. Wingo, 387 F.2d 330, 331 (6th Cir. 1967).
171. Note, Restitution and the Criminal Lw, 39 COLUm. L. RPv. 1185, 1203
(1939).
172. See generally Schafer, supra note 145.
173. "While it appears reasonable to use correctional restitution as one method of
dealing with criminals, if it were the only punishment available for any crime, it could
weaken the sense of wrongdoing attached to that crime-besides reducing the deterrent
effect of potential incarceration. It could expose the criminal justice system to the
danger that the criminal would escape punishment, which could well lead to social injus-
tice. While the wealthy, possibly professional criminal could buy his liberty, the impov-
erished criminal might eventually serve a longer punishment for a minor crime. If resti-
tution could be substituted for punishment or in any way make it possible to avoid pun-
ishment by payment, it might well have a reverse effect from, that intended. A man
should not be permitted 'to buy his way out' of criminal liability." Id. at 634.
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pounding would seem to encourage the concealment and unsupervised
compromise of criminal acts, its underlying purpose, to aid the victim
of a crime recover his loss, is certainly worthy of support. Thus an
alternative method of achieving that purpose appears necessary.
Consideration should be given to expanding the availability of ju-
dicially-approved compromise. This could both aid the victim and pro-
mote the reporting of crimes. If a procedure (by which a victim of
crime could report the offense and submit a proposed settlement for offi-
cial sanction) was widely available, well known, and reasonably free
of "red tape," it would achieve the objective of the Model Penal Code
approach without its disadvantages.
Existing compromise procedures are inadequate. They receive
occasional endorsement from the courts,174 but they are far too limited
in scope, since they apply only to certain specified classes of misde-
meanors.175  They are also not available in all jurisdictions.' 76
A less restrictive approach is needed. Professor Justin Miller sur-
veyed the compromise of criminal cases in 1927 and noted then that
since "our laws have not been made sufficiently elastic to permit...
non-trial adjustment, practices have grown up outside of the law.' '1 77
He proposed that
an orderly method of adjustment should be provided; which
would seem to require in each case, among other things, the con-
sent of some judicial or administrative officer or tribunal, with per-
haps the advice and consent of a district attorney, the consent of
the injured person, if possible, and the willing co-operation of the
defendant. In each case a record should be required which would
protect all persons involved in the settlement. 78
This proposal deserves reconsideration.
To be effective, the compromise procedure will have to be made
readily available; and to achieve sufficient availability, felonies as well
as misdemeanors must be eligible for sanctioned compromise, although
on public policy grounds it may be appropriate to exempt violent fel-
onies.
This proposal may incur strong opposition. 79  Even the limited
174. "The making of restitution is a commendable concept in the administration
of criminal justice. However, it is to be made subject to and under judicial control and
not as part of a bargain to avoid prosecution." People v. Anonymous B, 56 Misc. 2d
792, 795 N.Y.S.2d 507, 511 (Nassau County Ct. 1968) (emphasis added).
175. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
176. See note 91 supra.
177. Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases, 1 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 27 (1927).
178. Id. at 30-31.
179. "Mt may be questioned whether indiscriminate compromise statutes, covering
a wide range of offenses and involving restitution by the defendant, represents sound
policy." LAFAvE & ScoT, supra note 15, at 412.
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compromise procedure presently available has been criticized. For ex-
ample, the Arizona compromise statute was questioned in a recent case
where the defendant, who had been charged with vehicular misde-
meanor-manslaughter, settled with the family of the decedent and sub-
mitted the compromise for judicial approval. The lower court granted
the compromise and dismissed the case, and the supreme court grudg-
ingly affirmed the decision on appeal, noting an incongruous result:
If a drunk or reckless driver does not hit anyone, he may go tojail. . . . If guilty, he cannot escape punishment. There is no "in-jured person" or "injured party" or possible "remedy by civil ac-
tion," and the compromise statute may not be invoked. But if he
damages property, hits someone, or even kills them, under the com-
promise statute he may completely escape criminal punishment by
paying civil damages.' 80
Such criticism ignores the discretionary nature of the compromise. Ap-
proval is not automatic. If, in the eyes of a judge experienced in con-
sidering the state's interest, that interest warrants punishment of the
offender, he may deny the compromise. Such a denial might incon-
venience the victim who had proposed the compromise, but would not
affect his recourse to civil action to recover his loss.
Since the judge's approval power is discretionary, he should re-
ceive every assistance in exercising it. The system should, therefore,
call for at least the advice, and possibly the consent, of the prosecutor
concerned. Furthermore, since any discretionary power can be
abused, it would be appropriate to provide an avenue for appellate re-
view of the court's decision on the proposed compromise. Thus, if a
victim believed the compromise had been capriciously denied, an ap-
peal to a higher court would be readily available. Additionally, if the
prosecutor believed the compromise had been approved without due
consideration of the public interest, he should be permitted to appeal
the decision.
Preservation of an official record of the compromise would protect
the parties involved and guard against a criminal trying to take repeated
advantage of the system.
If there is a chance a proposed compromise may be denied, why
would a victim of crime risk submitting it? The answer rests on the
presumption that wherever possible there is a natural preference to
obey the law. At present, since many crimes cannot be legally com-
promised, they are illegally compounded. But if in more cases it
would be possible to obtain a legal, sanctioned compromise, it seems
180. State v. Garouette, 95 Ariz. 234, 239, 388 P.2d 809, 812 (1964). Arizona
subsequently amended its compromise statute to exclude compromise "[i]n the case of
manslaughter in the driving of a vehicle." ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1591 (Supp.
1973), as amended, ch. 58, § 1, [1969] Ariz. Laws 131.
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reasonable to assume a victim would prefer to try for it, rather than
commit a certain crime by concealing an illegal compromise. In those
cases where the criminal is unable to make immediate restitution and
offers a contract of repayment or promissory note, there would be a
special attraction for the official procedure in that an otherwise void
contract1 81 or note could be validated. For businessmen especially, it
would seem wiser to "gamble" on official approval in order to create
an enforceable debt than to commit a crime by accepting a surely un-
enforceable one.
Doubts have been expressed whether the courts could handle "the
endless and unwieldly administration of a restitution program,"'1 and
they may be well founded in view of the heavy load the courts already
shoulder. For this reason, some consideration should be given to en-
trusting the approval function to an administrative or quasi-judicial offi-
cer, although additional costs might result from the establishment of such
a program. Keeping this function in the courts, however, has the ad-
vantage of retaining discretionary power in those who have great experi-
ence and familiarity with the criminal law. But whether judge or ad-
ministrator, it appears preferable to rest this responsibility with some
official authority, and thereby stimulate reporting and supervised dis-
position of criminal cases, rather than promote an unchecked exercise
of private prosecutorial discretion and concealment of crimes.
Conclusion
Ignoring or condoning the compounding of a crime may lead to
a series of socially and morally undesirable results, including conceal-
ment of the existence of that crime, escape from punishment by its per-
petrator, and failure to protect society against his possible continued
criminal activity. Accordingly, if evidence of compounding is discov-
ered, prosecutors should carefully weigh prosecuting the offense not-
withstanding the difficulties such a prosecution may involve.
Even if condonation of compounding applies only to the victim of
a crime who compounds it to obtain restitution, the results may still be
unsatisfactory. Once compounded, the likelihood of discovery of a
crime is slim, so that the criminal's only consequence for his act will
be to make some degree of restitution. There may be cases where
society would demand no more, but it seems unsound to bestow the
discretion entirely in the victim, who is probably untrained in repre-
181. This presupposes that the compromise statute would provide that an approved
compromise is legal and constitutes a bar to subsequent civil action. See notes 94, 144
supra..
182. Ogren, The Ineffectiveness of the Criminal Sanction in Fraud and Corruption
Cases: Losing the Battle Against White-Collar Crime, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 959,
981 (1973).
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senting society's interest in criminal matters and whose judgment may
be colored by a strong personal interest in obtaining restitution. While
the victim may be permitted, at society's expense, to keep his silence,
he should not be allowed to sell it. Thus it is questionable whether
the Model Penal Code affirmative defense which condones compound-
ing by the victim of a crime represents sound policy.
Liberalizing statutory compromise procedures so that officially
sanctioned compromise is more readily available offers an alternative
which would promote, rather than discourage, the reporting of crimes.
Moreover, it would help restore official supervision and discretion to
the disposition of criminal offenses which now may entirely escape of-
fical attention.
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